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IN 1g8o, immediately after the Southern Historical Association Conven-
tion at the Biltmore Hotel in Atlanta, historian Peyton McCrary and a 
bevy of voting-rights lawyers gathered together a group of historians to try 
to engage them as expert witnesses in voting-rights litigation. Earlier in 
1980 in the case of Mobile v. Bolden, a plurality of the justices of the U.S. 
Supreme Court had decided that to sustain a claim of vote dilution under 
the Voting Rights Act or the Fifteenth Amendment, members of minority 
groups had to prove that the relevant law had been passed with a racially 
discriminatory purpose;11et merely that it had a current racially discrimi-
natory effect .1 Since the ordinance requiring that the Mobile City Com-
mission was to be elected at-large, rather than by single-member districts, 
had been passed (everyone thought at the time) in 1911, lawyers for the 
plaintiffs had no choice but to bring in the historians. 2 Because McCrary 
lived in Mobile and knew the lawyers who had filed the Bolden case, he 
took over the principal organizing task. Most of the historians present at 
the Biltmore seemed to respond favorably, and some ended up working in 
a few cases. Others, probably better advised, went back to their usual 
research and teaching. 
I was less prudent than other historians who attended that conference. 
The Biltmore meeting changed my life. Although McCrary bore the main 
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1. 446 u.s. 55 (1980). 
2. The fullest review of the evidence of historical intent in Bolden is Peyton McCrary's 
"History in the Courts: The Significance of Bolden v. City of Mobile," in Chandler Davidson, 
ed., Minority Vote Dilution (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1984), 47-63. 
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burden, I assisted him in doing the historical research for the retrial of the 
Bolden case, and after that, I was pretty much hooked. I largely pushed 
aside the research projects that I was then working on in order to devote 
large slices of my limited time over the next decade to analyzing local 
elections in such obscure places as Haywood County, Tennessee, and 
Bladen County, North Carolina, and to uncovering the motives of state 
legislators in Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina, city charter commis-
sion members in Memphis and Santa Monica, Boards of County Supervi-
sors in Los Angeles, San Diego, and Monterey Counties in California, and 
so on. 3 Instead of the quiet, sometimes fairly leisurely life of the aca-
demic, I began to have to meet the absurd demands and unreasonable 
deadlines of lawyers and judges, to suffer more or less in silence while 
overpaid and overbearing lawyers for the other side launched brutal and 
unwarranted assaults on my integrity, and to put up with colleagues who 
chided me for taking time away from "real scholarship" to devote myself to 
what they often considered politically incorrect tasks. Instead of publish-
ing in historical journals, I began to publish in law journals and collections 
of essays. 4 Instead of finishing various book projects, I completed longer 
and longer reports for court cases. 
Naturally, working in nearly a score of such cases has been interesting 
and rewarding. It is comforting to think that one had a part, however 
small, in reversing the effects of racial disfranchisement and vote dilution, 
not to mention the fact that the fees that I earned have helped to send my 
two children to college. But I want to argue in this paper that my and 
others' experiences have a good deal of significance, as well, for the study 
of history more generally. In a 1984 article in The Public Historian, I 
claimed that being an expert witness allowed me to "tell the truth and do 
good at the same time. "5 I now want to expand the claim by asserting that 
serving as an expert witness has forced me to think much more deeply and 
systematically about how to weigh evidence and to determine people's 
intentions; that it has underlined the importance of a belief in the possibil-
3. Taylor v. Haywood County, Tenn. Commission, 544 F.Supp. 1122 (W.D. Tenn., 
1982); Bladen County, N.C. v. U.S., No. 87-2974 (D.D.C., 1988); Mobile v. Bolden, 542 
F.Supp. 1050 (S.D. Ala. 1982); Moore v. Brown, 542 F. Supp. 1078 (1982); Brooks v. 
Harris, (N.D. Ga., Civ. Action No. 1: 90-CV-1001-RCF, 1990); Sumter County Council v. 
U.S. (D. D.C. 1982); U.S. v. City of Memphis (W.D. Tenn., 1991); Garza v. Los Angeles 
County Board of Supervisors, 756 F.Supp. 1298 (C. D. Cal., 1990), affirmed, 918 F.2d 763 
(1990); DeBaca v. San Diego County Board of Supervisors (S.D., Cal., Civ. No. 91-1282-
R(M), 1992); Gonzales v. Monterey County Board of Supervisors (N.D., Cal., Civ. No. C-91 
20736 W AI (PVf), 1992). 
4. "The Undermining of the First Reconstruction: Lessons for the Second," in David-
son, ed., Minority Vote Dilution, 27-46; "Expert Witnesses, Rational Choice, and the 
Search for Intent," Constitutional Commentary 5 (1988), 349-73; "How to Determine In-
tent: Lessons from L.A.," The journal of Law & Politics 7 (1991), 591-732; 'The Voting 
Rights Act and the Two Reconstructions," in Chandler Davidson and Bernard Grofman, 
eds., Controversies in Minority Voting: A Twenty-Five Year Perspective on the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1992), 135-76. 
5. "Are Expert Witnesses Whores?'' The Public Historian 6 (Winter 1984), 5-19. 
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ity of objective knowledge of the world, which it has recently become 
fashionable to doubt; and that it exposes as false the "radical" or "leftist" 
pose of some extreme relativists, from Charles A. Beard to the present. 
Contrary to Beard and Carl Becker, who thought that the traditional 
historical ideal of objectivity was inherently politically conservative, 6 I 
will contend that relativism is the natural handmaiden of reaction. 7 Only 
systematic research and thinking, subjected to the harshest criticism by 
oneself and others, can produce good history and can or should change the 
world. By contrast, the murky vaporings of recent relativists8 do not move 
the study of history forward-indeed, they scoff at the notion of cumula-
tive knowledge and even at the commonsense belief that one historical 
account may be judged superior to another-and they lend support to the 
status quo, often a racially and economically unjust status quo, by de-
fault. 9 Not only is there no contradiction between doing good, objective 
history and contributing to public policy, as naive objectivists thought, 10 
but lessons learned in the public arena may make it easier to attain objec-
tivity, and they may suggest ways to make our investigations of motives 
more precise and sophisticated. 
Briefly, my arguments are as follows: First, I believe that historians can 
often objectively and reliably determine the intent of policymakers, but 
that we need to think more systematically about how to do so. Determin-
ing intent might be considered a difficult task, but if it can be done 
objectively and reliably, so can other historical assignments. And if one 
can attain objectivity while serving as an expert witness, the view that it is 
possible in more normal historical pursuits will be considerably but-
6. Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American 
Historical Profession (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 254. The weak 
correlation between political ideology and views on the objectivity question is one of the 
themes of Novick's book (see pp. 264-68, 423-25). Nevertheless, in the 1930s and, I 
believe, in the 1980s and 1990s, critics of the ideal of objectivity appear to have been more 
prevalent on the political left than on the right. For example, Eve Kornfeld oflhandedly 
remarks that in graduate seminars on historical methods, "we can interrogate the students' 
desires for objectivity, ask which social groups are silenced under traditional claims to 
neutral truth, and explain that a threat to dominant white male power is indeed the point of 
many new methods." Kornfeld, "Gender and the the Politics of Teaching History," OAH 
Newsletter 20, no. 4 (November 1992), 4. 
7. In Tropics of Discourse (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 124, 
Hayden White asserts, on no evidence whatsoever, that the separation of history from fiction 
was part of the reaction against the French Revolution, thereby presumably making the 
distinction "rightist" from the beginning. 
8. See, e.g., Dominick LaCapra, Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Lan-
guage (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983), especially the introduction. 
When LaCapra refers to "historical 'reality' "he puts "reality" in quotation marks. See p. 25. 
In History and Criticism (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1985), LaCapra 
continues the attack on objectivism, decrying "historiography" as "a mythologized locus for 
some prediscursive image of'reality' "(p. 10). Documents, he says a page later, "are texts 
that supplement or rework 'reality' and not mere sources that divulge facts about 'reality.·" 
9. My observation is, naturally, not very original. See, e.g., Frederick Crews, 'The 
New Americanists," The New York Review of Books 39 (September 24, 1992), 32-34. 
10. Novick, That Noble Dream, 2. 
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tressed. Second, historians and other social scientists who want to help 
shape public policy must believe in the possibility of objectivity, because 
pubVc policy research and argumentation always involve mixed questions 
of fact and value. Relativistic attacks on the nature of knowledge and 
scholarship are therefore inherently conservative and irresponsible, be-
cause they rob scholars of their reputation for objectivity, which is key, if 
my own experience is any indication, to their ability to contribute to 
public policy. To know an imperfect world is to want to change it; to deny 
the possibility of knowing it is to perpetuate error or wrong, or at least to 
leave their correction or persistence to others. A relativist liberal or radi-
cal is a living oxymoron. 
I will try to demonstrate the plausibility of these arguments by discuss-
ing a legal case that dominated my life for 18 months. Four years ago, the 
Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund, the American 
Civil Liberties Union, and the U.S. Department of Justice filed the case 
of Yolanda Garza v. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors in federal 
district court, charging, among other things, that the supervisors had 
intentionally discriminated against Latinos in redistricting the boundaries 
of supervisorial districts. As the principal expert witness for the plaintiffs 
on the intent issue, I wrote what eventually became a 141-page paper on 
the subject, complete with 679 footnotes. 11 The intent issue, one that both 
sides down played or ignored at the beginning of the case, became, by the 
time it was appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the heart of 
the matter. There, a three-judge panel, including one of the most able, 
but also one of the most conservative Reagan appointees to the bench, 
Alex Kosinski, ruled that the Board of Supervisors' boundary lines were 
intentionally discriminatory, and that the issue of discriminatory effect, 
which had taken up the vast majority of the time at the federal district 
court trial, could be largely ignored. The U.S. Supreme Court refused 
review. How did I prove intent to the satisfaction of several judges?12 
11. "How to Determine Intent." Facts and analysis relating to the Garza case will be 
drawn, without further citation, from this article. As this instance illustrates, one need not 
shed scholarly habits when one operates outside the usual professional confines. Indeed, a 
scholarly mien and apparatus are necessary legitimating devices in court. Even more impor-
tant, a great deal that can be assumed when addressing a collegial professional audience 
must be spelled out in court testimony or reports for cases, so more detail is necessary. 
12. I do not mean to be excessively egotistical here. My experiences have no doubt 
differed from those of some other historians who have served as expert witnesses. Long 
before I began testifYing in courts, I had written about the intentions of the framers of 
electoral rules and the effects of those rules on minority voters, and I had extensively 
employed "ecological regression" analysis, which is the key statistical technique in voting 
rights cases. I had also taught courses in and written about equal protection law. Thus, 
attorneys could afford to be less directive than they might have been if there had not been 
such an exceptionally close fit between my scholarly and courtroom areas of expertise. 
Three other facts increased the leeway that I have enjoyed. First, in several cases, 
including Garza, I had more experience in voting rights litigation than some of the attorneys 
with whom I worked. Second, after the first few cases, I began to write increasingly long and 
painstakingly documented papers preliminary to my testimony. These reports are presented 
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During arguments over the extension of the Voting Rights Act in 1981-
82, proponents of changing Section 2 of the Act to overrule Bolden charged 
that 'the plurality opinion in that case required proof of"subjective intent," 
which some people apparently assumed meant that members of the legisla-
tive body that passed the rule or law had to confess in direct, preferably 
oath-bound statements to having had a racially discriminatory motivation, 
probably a hostile one, for their actions. As the principal attorney for the 
American Civil Liberties Union in Atlanta, Laughlin McDonald, put it, 
"nothing short of a body buried in a shallow grave will meet the City of 
Mobile test. "13 In certain instances, particularly in the South in the 1950s 
and 60s, legislators openly expressed their racially discriminatory purposes 
in passing certain election laws. Indeed, by ferreting out such statements in 
connection with Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 14 Peyton McCrary revolu-
tionized county governments all over the state of Alabama. But California 
politicians are generally a bit more careful and subtle about racial matters 
than those in Alabama, and the record in Garza contains no classic "smok-
ing gun" statement. Instead, circumstantial evidence was determinative. 
The most striking circumstantial evidence came from two maps, one of 
which depicted the growth of major concentrations of the Spanish-
surname or Latino population in Los Angeles county from 1960 through 
1980, and the other of which traced the extension during the same period 
of the boundaries of the Third Supervisorial District, which contained the 
largest percentage of the Latino population of any of the five districts in 
the country's most populous county government. I have superimposed 
one on the other in Figure 1. In 1960, the census tracts that were over 50 
percent Spanish-surname were largely in unincorporated East Los An-
geles and immediately adjacent areas. Over the 1960s and 1970s, the 
people of other ethnic groups largely left what is called the "Hispanic 
Core" of Los Angeles county around East Los Angeles, increasing the 
percentage of Latinos in the area. As more immigrants moved into the 
core, other Latinos moved east, out the San Gabriel Valley, and north, to 
another hub of Latino population centered on the city of San Fernando. 
The proportion of Latinos in the county's expanding population grew from 
less than 10 percent in 1960 to nearly 28 percent in 1980-well over the 
11 percent theoretically needed to control a supervisorial district and 
rather heavily concentrated geographically. 
to the court and serve as the natural organizing structure for my testimony and for parts of 
the attorneys' "proposed findings of facts" briefs. The discipline of writing forced me to 
confront nearly all the questions and attacks that attorneys on either side would raise before 
or during trials. Third, the voting rights bar is perhaps particularly professional and correct 
toward expert witnesses, realizing that the best way to make witnesses feel comfortable with 
their testimony is for the witnesses themselves to shape it. 
13. "Voting Rights Act: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate," 97 Cong., 2 Sess., (1982), I, 371, 
hereinafter cited as "Senate Hearings." 
14. 649 F.Supp. 289 (M.D. Ala. 1986). 
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FIGURE 1: THE HISPANIC CORE MOVES EAST, WHILE THE THIRD DISTRICT STRETCHES NORTHWEST-
MAJORITY LATINO CENSUS TRACTS IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 1960-80. 
By contrast, the boundaries of the Third District strained, as it were, in 
the opposite direction. Only once did the invisible wall between the First 
and Third supervisorial districts in East Los Angeles move east, and then 
only barely. Instead, the Third District moved west, taking in Beverly 
Hills, West Hollywood, and West Los Angeles-a 2.6 percent Spanish-
surnamed area, added to a 22.7 percent Spanish-surnamed district-and 
then north, up over the natural barrier of the Santa Monica Mountains 
into the San Fernando Valley, which was then nearly all white. Through 
1981, it moved right up to the boundary of 50 percent Latino census tracts 
around San Fernando and then stopped cold. In the five redistrictings 
from 1959 through 1981, the areas added to the Third District were 
always substantially more Anglo than the district as a whole. These bare 
demographic and political facts present a prima facie case of intent, be-
cause again and again, the members of the Board of County Supervisors 
acted to "whiten" the district, to dilute the power of the Latino population 
in the most straightforward sense of the word dilute. 
These maneuvers, which had a patently discriminatory effect, strongly 
suggested a racially discriminatory motivation. The suggestion was sup-
ported by a voluminous case record, including newspaper stories, min-
utes and a few transcripts of meetings of the Board of Supervisors and of 
their redistricting advisory committees, and the transcripts of 65 deposi-
tions, one 750 pages in length. Historians have long realized that trials 
preserve otherwise unavailable evidence. In this instance, the qualitative 
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data was rich enough to enable me to tell the redistricting story in consid-
erable detail. 
Part of the analysis rested on a simple narrative, on the historical con-
text of the redistrictings. In 1958, six-term Supervisor John Anson Ford 
retired from the Third District seat. Three Los Angeles city councilmen 
and a member of that city's Board of Education contested the open seat. 
In something of an upset, Edward Roybal, the first Latino elected to the 
Los Angeles City Council in this century, made the runoff against Ernest 
Debs, a rather conservative Anglo Democrat. The runoff was extremely 
close, with Debs being declared the winner after four recounts. Many 
Latino voters were challenged at the polls and some were discouraged 
from voting, and there are people in Los Angeles today who will tell you 
that Roybal was counted out illegally. 
After his inauguration as supervisor, a year before the census was to be 
taken, without any compulsion whatever from state law, Ernest Debs 
worked out a private agreement with Fourth District Supervisor Burton 
Chace that Chace would give him the three white western areas men-
tioned above. There were no other boundary changes, despite the fact 
that one supervisorial district, the First District, which was immediately 
to the east of Deb's district, was grossly overpopulated. The area that 
Chace deeded to Debs just happened to contain the residence of Chace's 
most potent prospective opponent, Los Angeles city councilwoman Rosa-
lind Wyman, who was expected to run against Chace in 1960, but who 
would have had to move to do so after the 1959 boundary change. Debs 
obtained a very wealthy area that would obviously not be fertile ground 
for Roybal, who was not only a Latino, but also a former community 
organizer for Saul Alinsky. Although there were no blatant statements on 
the record about the exchange, and although the county refused to make 
Debs available for deposition or testimony, the conjunction of events was 
exceptionally suggestive. In ensuing years, Debs tried to unload East Los 
Angeles on other supervisors, refused to take adjacent eastern areas, and 
worked out complicated swaps with other supervisors to move his district 
north, instead of east. Every time they redistricted, the supervisors had 
before them options that they were either explicitly told or that they could 
easily determine from common observation would swell the Latino per-
centage in the Third District, and in nearly every instance, they chose 
other options. In 1971 and 1981, when Latinos organized specifically to 
increase their percentages in the Third and/or First Districts, the supervi-
sors brushed their efforts aside, often patronizingly or even angrily. The 
pattern of events, the repetition of the same whitening, incumbent-
protecting line-drawing year after year for more than two decades, pre-
sented with as much detail as I could muster, destroyed any possible 
unintended consequences hypothesis. The supervisors were told again 
and again what consequences would follow from their actions, and they 
chose, with foresight, to take actions that decreased the ability of Latinos 
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to elect candidates of their choice and increased the ability of Anglo 
incumbents to retain office. 
In an attempt to systemize my own thinking about intent and to offer a 
guid~ to the ways in which judges in civil rights cases had thought about 
the subject, I suggested in the published version of my Garza testimony 
that evidence of intent in voting rights cases might be analyzed under 
nine headings, or, as lawyers like to refer to such analyses, under nine 
"factors." Four have already been mentioned above: "smoking gun" state-
ments, demographic trends, the text of a law or the outlines of district 
boundaries, and the historical context of a decision. Another is basic 
models of human behavior or, in this case, of political behavior. Should 
we expect, on the basis of experience and our knowledge of the past, that 
politicians who redraw boundaries for their own or their bosses' or allies' 
districts are merely selfless, public-spirited citizens, seeking only, as Ron 
Smith, an extremely hard-boiled political consultant, testified in Garza, 
"to do a noble and good thing?" Or is reapportionment, like the making of 
sausages or love, something one should always avoid observing? Is it likely 
that Anglo pols fastidiously protect the rights of unrepresented minorities 
during redistricting-as the same consultant put it, that he and his Repub-
lican allies wanted only to "maximize Hispanic empowerment?" Or have 
most white politicians been discriminating against minorities in line-
drawing since the first redistrictings involving areas where enough mem-
bers of minority groups could vote to make a difference? Models of behav-
ior should not by themselves determine the fate of hypotheses, or why 
look at evidence at all? But they do channel our research in one direction 
or another, and they do affect the attitude with which we receive informa-
tion. In my case at least, I read the statements of Ron Smith with a 
skepticism that rapidly developed into incredulity. 
Two basic political facts constitute the sixth factor in the order listed 
here: the number of members of minority groups _elected, and the extent 
of racially polarized voting. If the favored candidates of African Ameri-
cans, Latinos, or Asian/Pacific Islanders regularly win election in a jurisdic-
tion in which their voters do not constitute voting majorities, it is difficult 
to argue that the electoral structure is discriminatory. In Los Angeles 
county, Latino voters clearly had difficulty electing the candidates that 
they most preferred. In fact, no Latino had been elected to the five-
member Board of County Supervisors since 1874, although the county 
was, by 1990, 37 percent Latino. Analyses of elections involving Latino 
against Anglo candidates, moreover, showed a good deal of ethnic polariza-
tion. Too few Anglos would vote for Latino candidates to enable them to 
win in majority-Anglo jurisdictions. For blacks, the evidence was more 
ambiguous. Although Kenneth Hahn, who represented the South-Central 
Los Angeles Second Supervisorial District from 1952 to 1992, was white, 
he was clearly the choice of the black community. In 1968, for instance, 
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he beat a popular black Los Angeles city councilman 2-1 even in Watts in 
a supervisor's race, and he never again attracted serious opposition. On 
the other hand, the effort of a brilliant and attractive black "cross-over 
politician," Yvonne Burke, to win the Fourth District seat to which Gov. 
Jerry Brown had appointed her failed in a virulently racist campaign in 
1980 masterminded by the same Ron Smith whose unctuous statements 
about his motives in redistricting I quoted earlier. 15 
How do the number of people elected and the extent of racially polar-
ized voting fit into an examination of intent? If one can show that these 
facts are widely known and well understood by political activists, particu-
larly by those who helped draw the lines, then the clear implication is that 
that knowledge at least partially conditioned the delineation of the bound-
aries. In Los Angeles in 1972, for instance, City Councilman Ed Edelman 
worked very hard to draw a seat for that body in which Latinos made up 
about three-fourths of the population-and which contained the resi-
dence of an Anglo foe of Edelman's, a wily politician who managed barely 
to survive several tough campaigns against him by Latino populations. 
When Edelman succeeded Ernest Debs in the Third District of the 
County Board of Supervisors, he obviously knew how to draw a Latino 
seat, he must have recognized the degree of racially polarized voting, and 
he manifestly understood that, because the Latino population in the area 
was young and disproportionately made up of noncitizens, the population 
would have to be substantially more than 50 percent Latino to defeat a 
competent, well-financed Anglo incumbent. When he led the reapportion-
ment of the County Supervisors in 1981, Edelmen could calculate the 
political effects of adding or subtracting Latino areas to his and other 
districts with almost scientific precision. 
The seventh and eighth factors are the backgrounds of key deci-
sionmakers and other actions taken by them. Two members of the Supervi-
sorial Boundary Commission in 1981, Ron Smith and Allan Hoffenblum, 
had managed extremely controversial victories by Anglo candidates over 
black and Latino politicians. In a recent case involving the Monterey 
County, California, Board of Supervisors, Michal Moore, the prime mover 
in that county's 1981 reapportionment, had first won election by defeating a 
much better-known and better-financed African-American candidate. 
Moore was an outspoken opponent of affirmative-action plans, and, al-
though much of his constituency was urban, he led efforts to cut social 
services in the county after the 1978 passage of the property-tax-cutting 
initiative, Proposition 13. One of the chief proponents of the runoff and 
designated post laws in Memphis in the 1950s and 60s was the late Henry 
Loeb, who built his very successful local political career on opposition to 
15. After Hahn retired, Burke won a very close contest to replace him, beating African-
American State Senator Diane Watson by less than one percent of the vote. Among regis-
tered voters, the predominant group in the Second District was black. 
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integration and whose staunch refusal to compromise with the sanitation 
workers in 1968 brought Martin Luther King, Jr. to Memphis. 16 
Protestations by such men that their intent is racially benevolent or that 
racial considerations played no part in their efforts to redraw electoral 
regulations ring hollow. Similarly, it is at least questionable that a political 
body that denies representatives of minority groups the opportunity to 
participate meaningfully in the process of drawing up new boundaries or 
laws truly takes the interests of those groups into consideration. Assuming 
that people act with some degree of consistency, their backgrounds and 
actions on related issues allow inferences about their motivations in the 
matters in question. 
State policies and formal and informal institutional rules constitute the 
ninth factor. How much choice in electoral structures or procedures does a 
locality have? If they have a range of options, and choose ones least favor-
able to minority groups; or if they depart from normal procedures or apply 
criteria inconsistently in a manner that harms minority groups, then their 
actions support an infm;ence of discriminatory purpose. In Monterey 
county, for instance, the Board of Supervisors in 1991 set a public goal of 
not splitting cities, but it divided two adjacent cities in which blacks and 
Asians are concentrated among four of the five supervisorial districts, frag-
menting their numbers and diminishing their potential political power. In 
Haywood county, Tennessee, the Road Commission had been elected by 
districts for four decades, until a black won a seat, after which the county 
fathers of the majority-white county decided to switch to at-large elections. 
Choice, foresight, and action with a discriminatory effect are three impor-
tant elements in nearly all of the nine factors. 
Naturally, those attempting to determine intent in different matters 
will take into account somewhat different factors. The process of subdivid-
ing the overall question into manageable pieces, arraying the evidence 
under each heading, and weighing what judges have referred to as "the 
totality of the circumstances,"17 however, should be basically similar to 
the instance of vote dilution. The keys are self-consciousness and care in 
the task of explanation. 
Are we warranted in asserting that the conclusions reached through this 
process of subdivision, self-consciousness, and care are "objective"? As 
historians have become aware since the publication of Peter Novick's 
fascinating and provocative book That Noble Dream, the "objectivity ques-
16. Where several officials are elected to the same body at-large, rather than by districts, 
they may be elected to designated posts (such as Commissioner of Public Works or Judge of 
Court Number Three) or all may go on the same ticket, with the top two or three or some 
other number being elected. The latter or "free-for-all" system may allow large minorities to 
obtain some representation on the board by casting fewer than the maximum number of 
votes that they could cast. See Kousser, "Was Memphis's Electoral Structure Adopted or 
Maintained for a Racially Discriminatory Purpose?" Caltech Social Science Working Paper 
#807 (August 1992). 
17. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 753 (1973). 
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tion" has agitated American historians throughout the twentieth century. 
There are many points of agreement between all but the most naive 
objectivist and most extreme relativist points of view. Surely few histori-
ans any longer believe that they begin with blank slates; that their models 
and methods do not affect the questions they ask, the data that they can 
examine, and the conclusions that are within their reach; or that they are 
merely perfect conductors for the unobtrusive transmission of raw facts. 
Furthermore, tastes and circumstances obviously affect the historian's 
choice of topics-southerners often tell about the South, thesis advisers 
channel their students, a newly discovered or newly opened document 
collection or a new method of analyzing old materials leads people to 
certain subjects, and nearby sources invite convenient attention. Objectiv-
ists would agree, too, that the frailties of individual historians, including 
themselves, may prevent any one account from being definitive. A lack of 
imagination may cause a scholar not to formulate a correct hypothesis, and 
deficient comprehension may result in a faulty analysis of evidence. Objec-
tivism must allow for imperfection, just as relativism must allow for quotid-
ian objectivity, for the importance of getting names, dates, places, the 
provenance of documents, the representativeness of a sample, or the use 
of a statistical procedure right. 
On the other hand, the vieWJ> of some subjectivists are so extreme that 
they may be ignored. A few historians or critics-Hayden White is the 
foremost example-so strongly believe that reality is chaotic and/or that 
humans are inveterately inconsistent that any explanation or even coher-
ent narrative is inherently false or fundamentally untestable. 18 After so 
much argument over the "objectivity question," the real points of disagree-
ment have sharpened, as they have generally narrowed. 
For most historians, the assessment of competing hypotheses probably 
contains the crux of the problem of objectivity. Does the historian inevita-
bly select and weigh the facts to fit her case? This was the logical center-
piece of the Becker/Beard attacks on objectivism in their American His-
torical Association presidential addresses in the early 1930s, and it is the 
fundamental point of attack in every cross-examination of an expert wit-
ness in a trial. 19 It is here that my experience in testifYing in legal cases 
most reinforces the standards of the best analytical and social scientific 
history. The surest approach to truth, whether considered as a correspon-
dence with reality, a coherent account, or a view that compels consensual 
agreement within a conversational community, lies in a rigorous adher-
ence to "scientific" principles. Most importantly, as casework under-
scores, no historical analysis is complete without posing and examining 
other potential competing explanations. No empirical argument is fully 
acceptable unless other hypotheses are explicitly considered and refuted. 
18. White took this view at a panel on narrative at the 1983 convention of the American 
Historical Association. I was, physically at least, on the same panel. 
19. Novick, That Noble Dream, 260-62. 
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The legal environment at once encourages and impairs the full and 
unbiased evaluation of other theories. It encourages such an evaluation 
beca,use opposing experts and attorneys or judges and their clerks will 
surely try to account for the evidence in some other way, and they are 
generally clever enough to come up with a range of alternatives. The legal 
environment impairs evaluation because one may become psychologically 
committed to a particular explanation and may therefore try to explain 
away contradictory evidence rather than abandon one's interpretation. Of 
course, this happens in "normal" scholarship in every field from physics to 
literary criticism. Indeed, the tendency for a scholar to hold to a staked-
out position may be greater in controversies within than outside the acad-
emy, for in career terms, merely "academic" matters are much more 
important than those involved in consulting work. Still, a trial is usually 
somewhat more overtly combative than most seminars or convention ses-
sions. It therefore furthers the search for truth to set down contending 
theses in print and to consider the evidence for and against them before 
the trial or deposition, while there is time for reflection, instead of only 
dealing with them in the' heat of battle. 
But what can we say after comparing the merits of opposing hypothe-
ses? Can we announce that we have discovered a truth that can never be 
overturned, that no rational person can disagree with? Is this what objec-
tivity amounts to? I think not, for humans are frail and may be mistaken 
and illogical, or someone may subsequently discover new evidence or 
methods. The right question, and the only one, it seems to me, that 
objectivists need answer is this: On the available evidence, analyzed with 
care, using the most appropriate methods, is this the best warranted 
explanation of any that one can think of for the act or event or structure at 
issue? Every device, every technique, every form of organization or argu-
ment that enables the historian to answer this question should, in my 
view, be encouraged and adopted, and all that do not should be discour-
aged and discarded. It follows that flights of fancy, unselfconscious narra-
tives, a lack of documentation, unclear prose, and conclusions hedged to 
avoid controversy or bad reviews should be abandoned in all forms of 
history and in all forums in which it is presented. There is plenty of room 
for creativity in devising theories and organizing information to test them. 
If this argument and definition are correct, one of the most striking 
responses to Novick's book, that of Richard G. Hewlett, the distinguished 
historian of the Atomic Energy Commission, in The Public Historian, is 
misleading. Claiming that "the Beard-Becker defense of relativism" laid 
"the intellectual foundations of the public history movement," Hewlett 
contends that "in trying to describe events in the recent past, public 
historians are usually more aware than are their clients that they are not 
presenting objective truths that will stand for all time. The obvious scar-
city of perspective and the sure knowledge that events of next year or the 
next decade may cast an entirely new light on what they are writing makes 
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any pretense of objectivity fatuous."20 Hewlett, who certainly both prac-
tices and preaches what he calls "honest history," seems to me to confuse 
objectivity with omniscience. 
Not only has serving as an expert witness led me to reflect on what 
makes good historical practice, it has also forced me to consider what 
counts as a motive and what are the connections between empirical and 
value judgments. Those in the civil rights community who were most 
concerned about the Bolden "purpose" standard, as against "effects," in 
the early 1980s probably had three primary concerns: First, that anti-civil 
rights judges would set such an unreasonable threshold for proving pur-
pose that one would never be able to demonstrate it. 21 Second, that if 
jurisdictions or their lawyers came up with any nonracial motive for an 
electoral law change whatsoever, judges would grasp it and defer to the 
legislature. 22 Instead of a racial motive tainting one or more nonracial 
ones, the reverse would happen. Third, that judges would demand nonex-
istent evidence of motives23-for example, clear statements of racial pur-
pose by a majority of the 1874 Alabama state legislators who passed the 
Mobile City Charter. 
For the most part, these fears have not been borne out. As to the first 
concern, for every Irby v. Fitz-Hugh,24 in which judges interpreted the 
evidence unfairly, there is at least one Garza. As to the second, lawyers 
have certainly come up With some inventive arguments about justificatory 
motives. During the Appeals Court phase of Garza, for instance, the 
attorneys for Los Angeles County conceded that the supervisors had 
drawn the lines to protect their own seats and those of their ideological 
allies, and claimed that the adverse effect on Latino political fortunes was 
purely incidental. In the recent Monterey County case, attorneys con-
tended that it was permissible to fragment the black and Asian/Pacific 
Islander communities in order to reduce the workload of an Anglo Supervi-
sor.25 These and similar examples demonstrate the importance of concen-
trating on foresight, interconnected motives, and available evidence in 
any inquiry into intent. If a person is aware that her action will cause 
something to occur, and if she goes ahead with it, then she wills the 
20. Roundtable, "'The Ideal of Objectivity' and the Profession of History," The Public 
Historian 13 (Spring 1991), 10-14. 
21. "Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights of the Committee of the Judiciary, House of Representatives," 97th 
Cong., 1st sess. (1981), 2042-43 (testimony of Armand Derfner). 
22. Ibid., 2054 (testimony of Armand Derfner). This was allegedly referred to by Mr. 
Justice Rehnquist as the "straight-face test." In Derfner's summary: "If the city or county can 
advance a justification without actually laughling while it says so, that would be accepted ... 
23. "Senate Hearings," 372 (testimony of Laughlin McDonald). 
24. 692 F. Supp. 610 (E. D. Va. 1988), 693 F. Supp. 424 (E. D. Va. 1988), 889 F.2d 1352 
(4th Cir. 1989). 
25. The irony of trying to justify discrimination against minorities on the grounds that it 
allowed whites to work less hard apparently has yet to occur to these supervisors or the 
County Counsel. 
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occurrence, whether she would have most preferred something else to 
happen or not. In Monterey County, for instance, two Democratic super-
visors somewhat reluctantly voted to continue the fragmentation of the 
African-American and Asian-American communities in order to draw two 
seats where Latinos would have good chances to elect candidates of their 
choice. I think their actions indicate a racially discriminatory intent. In 
Garza, the only way for the Anglo supervisors to retain their seats was by 
ethnically conscious gerrymandering. Since the motives were so intermin-
gled that one cannot effectively distinguish them, both must count. 
In regard to the third concern, that of incomplete evidence of motives, 
that is simply a condition of existence. Historians would almost always like 
to have more evidence of what happened, but we must be satisfied with 
doing the best we can with existing evidence, and it would clearly be 
unreasonable to require more. For us, the past is effectively what remains 
of the past, and an objective view is objective in relation to those remains, 
not to what has ceased to leave traces, which we can obviously never 
completely recapture. Moreover, although we should attempt to regular-
ize procedures for fixing causes as much as possible, it is not possible to 
reduce the search to pure mechanics, for each situation will differ in many 
particulars. Investigating different cases reaffirms the historian's twin con-
cerns for generalization and specificity. 
One final point. I obviously believe in the protection of minority voting 
rights, and one of the chief reasons that I spend time on such cases is to try 
to insure that those rights are enjoyed fully. But the best way for us to act to 
protect them is to be as clear-headed, skeptical, and unbiased as we can. 
There is no contradiction between pursuing our desires for public policy 
and remaining unbiased in our scholarship. On the contrary, unless schol-
ars constantly strive both to be and to appear objective, we will and should 
be treated as mere purveyors of opinions-no more worthy of being lis-
tened to than anyone else with a point of view, however ill-considered or 
unsubstantiated it is. Fulfilling our value-laden noble dreams, then, re-
quires our adherence to the noble dream of the profession-objectivity. 
